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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

JANE DOE as Guardian of J. DOE, a
minor, and in her individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

WASHOE COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, a political subdivision of
the State of Nevada, its BOARD OF
TRUSTEES, and its
SUPERINTENDENT, DR. SUSAN
ENFELD, DOES I-XX and ROE
entities I-XX.

Defendants.

Case No: 3:23-cv-00129 ART-CLB

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

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MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

COME NOW, PLAINTIFS, JANE DOE *Et Al*, by and through the undersigned attorney of record, SIGAL CHATTAH, ESQ., of the CHATTAH LAW GROUP, and JOEY S. GILBERT, ESQ of JOEY GILBERT LAW and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65, hereby move this Court for a preliminary injunction against Defendants, to enjoin the Washoe County School District (hereinafter “WCSD”) from engaging in and enforcing Administrative Regulation 5161 GENDER IDENTITY AND GENDER NON-CONFORMITY – STUDENTS.

9 The purpose of this Motion is made because Defendants continue to promote this
10 Regulation, directly interfering with parental rights of custody and control of their children.
11 This Regulation continues to violate the First, fourteenth and Ninth Amendments. Defendants
12 have bypassed Plaintiffs’ due process rights and Plaintiffs are entitled to relief thereon.

13
14 Plaintiffs’ Motion is based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, the Exhibits
15 attached and Declarations filed concurrently herewith, and the following points and
16 authorities.

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INTRODUCTION

Nearly a century of Supreme Court precedent makes two things clear: parents have a constitutional liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children, and students do not abandon their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gate.

WCSD is flouting both of these constitutional guarantees through its adoption of Administrative Regulation 5161 GENDER IDENTITY AND GENDER NON-CONFORMITY – STUDENTS (hereinafter “The Regulation” and “5161” *inter alia*)

This Regulation authorizes schools and children to make fundamentally important decisions concerning their gender identity without any parental involvement and to then hide these decisions from their parents. Per the Policy, Transgender and gender non-conforming

1 students have a right to privacy, including keeping private their sexual orientation, gender
2 identity, transgender status, or gender non-conforming presentation at school.

3 Transgender and gender non-conforming students have the right to discuss and express
4 their gender identity and expression openly and to decide when, with whom, and how much
5 to share their private information.

6 WUSD has also instituted a program called “Brave Space” Training for the purposes
7 of training educators and school administrators how to address these gender identity and
8 gender non-conformity matters by bypassing parental notification and referral to third party
9 (off school-site) organizations to seek help with non-conformity issues.

10 WUSD allows teachers and administrators to attend three-day training sessions to
11 learn how to institute Brave space policies, obstructing parental rights. Plaintiffs bring this
12 Motion to enjoin WUSD from enforcement of Reg 5161 in its entirety as it applies to gender
13 identity studies and policies.

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16 **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

17 Following a series of events in school with minor J. Doe at Depaoli Middle School,
18 Plaintiff obtained information regarding WUSD Gender Identity/Non-conformity studies and
19 Brave Space training from Depaoli faculty.

20 Plaintiff Doe was advised that Depaoli teachers call students by their preferred
21 pronouns and that there was a gender policy that assured the students secrecy from their
22 parents. Plaintiff investigated the Brave Space training programs and obtained the material
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1 provided in the 3-day Brave Space training program which took place via zoom on April,
2 17th, 19th, and 20th, 2023.¹

3 This program was hosted by WCSD included LGBTQ Education. It became clear
4 through the materials presented that the training “Brave Space” teachers were provided was in
5 direct contradiction with parental rights. Plaintiff was appalled to see that the Brave Space
6 Training actually includes training teachers to hide students’ “identities” from their own
7 parents *See Exhibit 1; P021, P026.*²

8
9 Day 3 of the Brave Space training focused on WCSD Reg 5161³ provides the
10 following:

- 11 • “[S]taff **shall not disclose information** that may reveal a student’s transgender or
12 gender non-conforming status to others, **including parents/guardians** or other
13 staff members, unless there is a specific ‘need to know,’ they are legally required
14 to do so, or the student has authorized such disclosure.” [*Emphasis added*]
- 15
16 • “[S]taff must be mindful of the confidentiality and privacy rights of students when
17 **contacting parents/guardians so as to not reveal, imply or refer to a student’s**
18 actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression.”
19 [*Emphasis added*]
- 20
21 • “[S]tudents have the right to be addressed by the names and pronouns that
22 correspond **to their gender identity.**” [*Emphasis added*]

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28 ¹ See *Exhibit “1”* Brave Space slides P001-031.

² See Plaintiffs’ Declaration incorporated by reference hereto as to the nature of Brave Space Training.

³ See Reg 5161 in its entirety, attached hereto and incorporated herewith as *Exhibit “2”*

1 (2008). Under the *Winter* test, the plaintiff has the burden to establish: (1) likelihood of
2 success on the merits; (2) that the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the
3 preliminary injunction is not granted; (3) that the balance of equities favors the plaintiff; and
4 (4) that the injunction is in the public interest. *Id.* Likelihood of success on the merits is a
5 threshold inquiry and the most important factor. *See, e.g., Edge v. City of Everett, 929 F.3d*
6 *657, 663 (9th Cir. 2019).*

7
8 Alternatively, a court may grant the injunction if the plaintiff demonstrates either a
9 combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that
10 serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. *NRDC v.*
11 *Winter, 518 F.3d at 677 (internal citations omitted).*ⁱ In our circuit, there is no presumption
12 that the issuance of a preliminary injunction requires an evidentiary hearing. *See Int'l*
13 *Molders' & Allied Workers' Local Union v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 555 (9th Cir. 1986).*

14
15 ***I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits***

16 Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits, or at least have raised a serious question to
17 the merits of their procedural and substantive due process claims against Defendants. To
18 prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show the deprivation of a federal
19 right by a person acting under color of state law. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly stated that
20 “[t]o obtain relief on a procedural due process claim, the plaintiff must establish the existence
21 of (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the constitution; (2) a deprivation of the
22 interest by the government; 3) lack of process.” *See Shanks v Dessel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1090*
23 *(9th Cir. 2008).*

24
25 Here, Plaintiffs are forced to capitulate to a policy that not only violates their freedom
26 of speech and religious freedoms, but also deliberately interferes with parental rights and the
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1 family unit. Notwithstanding same, it subjects to students to discipline for a refusal to
2 acquiesce to such conduct.

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4 **B. DEFENDANTS EXCLUDE PARENTS FROM DECISIONS REGARDING**
5 **GENDER IDENTITY IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH**
6 **AMENDMENT**

7 “[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children[] is perhaps
8 the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme] Court.” *Troxel v.*
9 *Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality). Children are “not the mere creature of the state,”
10 *Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary*, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925),
11 and the “right[] ... to raise one’s children ha[s] been deemed ‘essential’” and one of the
12 “‘basic civil rights of man,’” *Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). These parental
13 rights are rooted in the “historical[] ... recogni[tion] that natural bonds of affection lead
14 parents to act in the best interests of their children.” *Parham v. J. R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)
15 (citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, 447; 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law,
16 190).

17
18 Thus, “[i]t is cardinal” that “‘the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
19 the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
20 can neither supply nor hinder.’” *Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting *Prince v. Massachusetts*,
21 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). “This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
22 children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.” *Wisconsin v.*
23 *Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).

24
25 A child’s gender identity implicates the most fundamental issues concerning the child,
26 including the child’s religion, medical care, mental health, sense of self, and more. Yet despite
27 “extensive precedent” that parents must be involved in decisions concerning these types of
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1 issues, *Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 66 (listing cases), school districts across the country are
2 increasingly excluding parents from decision making when gender identity is involved. “In the
3 past few years, school districts nationwide have quietly adopted policies requiring staff to
4 facilitate and ‘affirm’ gender identity transitions at school without parental notice or
5 consent—and even in secret from parents.” Luke Berg, *How Schools’ Transgender Policies*
6 *Are Eroding Parents’ Rights*, 1, American Enterprise Institute, (Mar. 2022),
7 <https://bit.ly/39s1GQF>.

9 Under parental exclusion policies, “[e]ducators and staff,” not parents, “work closely
10 with the student to determine what changes are necessary . . . to ensure their safety and well-
11 being.” GLSEN & National Center for Transgender Equality, *Model Local Education Policy*
12 *on Transgender and Non-Binary Students*, 7-8 (Sept. 2018), <https://bit.ly/3PHTyv9>.

14 Parental exclusion policies “run directly against a strong body of case law recognizing
15 parents’ constitutional rights to raise their children.” Berg, *supra*, at 2. Nevertheless, they
16 have proliferated to school districts across the country, including Washoe County.

17 The Due Process Clause in the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution
18 protects the fundamental right of parents to direct the education, upbringing and the care,
19 custody, and control of their children. *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); *Troxel*
20 *v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).

22 Defendants have violated and are violating Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to make
23 decisions regarding the upbringing, education, custody, care, and control of their children in
24 establishing and implementing Regulation 5161 that prohibits informing parents regarding
25 their children’s assertions regarding gender non-conformity, transgender status and attendant
26 requests to affirm alternate identities unless their minor children of any age consent.
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1 Defendants have acted and are acting with reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’
2 fundamental parental rights by purposefully and intentionally concealing critical information
3 regarding the upbringing and care of their children, *i.e.*, that the children are asserting a
4 discordant gender identity, that the children have requested to be addressed by an opposite sex
5 name and pronouns and other information associated with affirming the child’s assertions.
6

7 Defendants have acted and are acting with reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’
8 fundamental parental rights by continuing to implement this protocol, *i.e.*, a *de facto* school
9 district policy of undermining parental authority based on an unsubstantiated assertion that
10 state law and WCSO Regulation provides that children of any age have the authority to
11 determine whether their parents will be informed when they raise issues of gender non-
12 conformity or transgender status, request to be called by an alternative name or pronouns and
13 even use privacy facilities designated for the opposite sex.
14

15 In so doing, Defendants are explicitly and intentionally excluding Plaintiffs from
16 significant decision-making directly related to their children’s care.

17 Under binding precedent, the Fourteenth Amendment “includes a substantive
18 component that ‘provides heightened protection against government interference with certain
19 fundamental rights and liberty interests.’” *Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 65 (quoting *Washington v.*
20 *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)). Among these unenumerated rights are those that are
21 “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’” and “‘implicit in the concept of
22 ordered liberty.’” *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.*, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2257-58 (2022)
23 (quoting *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 721).
24

25 The “liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children[]
26 is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme] Court.”
27 *Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 65. Nearly 100 years ago, the Supreme Court held that the “liberty”
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1 protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of parents to “establish a home and
2 bring up children” and “to control the education of their own.” *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S.
3 390, 399 (1923).

4 Two years later, the Court held that the “liberty of parents and guardian” includes the
5 right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” *Pierce*, 268 U.S.
6 at 534- 35 (1925). As the Court explained, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State;
7 those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
8 recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” *Id.* at 535.

10 Parents are **entitled** to ask on a regular basis whether their children have requested or
11 have engaged in “Brave Space” advice, whether their children have made requests or actions
12 have been taken concerning their children’s gender identity, and whether the WCSD has any
13 other information that would reveal their children’s “transgender status.” Yet under
14 Regulation 5161, WCSD *will not tell them* any of this information. It is impossible for parents
15 to direct the “care, custody, and control of their children” when WCSD withholds critical
16 information from them.

18 Regulation 5161 also deprives parents of the right to have any input or control over
19 fundamental decisions concerning gender identity. Under the Regulation, the parent has no
20 control over how WCSD treats their child.

22 Without *any* parental input, the District can (1) require all employees and students to
23 address the child by a new name; (2) require all employees and students to address the child
24 through a new pronoun; (3) have the child’s name changed on numerous government
25 documents, including identification cards, yearbooks, and diplomas; (4) allow the child to use
26 the restrooms, locker rooms, and changing facilities that correspond with the child’s gender
27 identity; (5) allow the child to participate in physical education classes, intramural sports,
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1 clubs, and other events that correspond with the child’s gender identity; and (6) allow the
2 child to room with other students who share the child’s gender identity. These are
3 *fundamental decisions* implementing the most basic questions about a child’s life, including
4 issues of religion, medical care, mental and emotional well-being, the child’s sense of self,
5 and more.

6 A recent decision from the District of Kansas is directly on point. There, a local school
7 board policy prohibited teachers from “revealing to a student’s parents a preferred name or
8 pronouns the student is using at school if the student has not authorized the parents to know.”
9 *Ricard v. USD 475 Geary County, KS*, 2022 WL 1471372, at *4-5 (D. Kan. May 9, 2022).
10 Discussing the “constitutional right [of parents] to control the upbringing of their children,”
11 the court found it inconceivable that a school district could constitutionally “withhold[] or
12 conceal[] from the parents of minor children information fundamental to a child’s identity,
13 personhood, and mental and emotional well-being such as their preferred name and
14 pronouns.” *Id.* at *8. Whether “the District likes it or not,” the constitutional right of parents
15 “includes the right of a parent to have an opinion and to have a say in what a minor child is
16 called and by what pronouns they are referred.” *Id.*

17 WCSO may be concerned that some parents are unsupportive of their child’s desire to
18 be referred to by a name other than their legal name, to use different pronouns, or to
19 implement other decisions involving gender identity. But this “merely proves the point that
20 the District’s claimed interest is an impermissible one because it is intended to interfere with
21 the parents’ exercise of a constitutional right to raise their children as they see fit.” *Id.*

22 The government must afford a “presumption of validity” to parental decisions unless
23 there is clear evidence to the contrary. *Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 67. As “long as a parent adequately
24 cares for his or her children (*i.e.*, is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject
25

1 itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make
2 the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.” *Id.* at 68-69; *see Ricard,*
3 *2022 WL 1471372, at *8* (envisioning a “particularized and substantiated concern that
4 disclosure to a parent could lead to child abuse, neglect, or other *illegal* conduct”). But
5 “[s]imply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child ... does not
6 automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or
7 officer of the state.” *Parham, 442 U.S. at 60.*

9 Here, the District “not only fail[s] to presume” that parents will “act in the best interest
10 of their children, [it] assume[s] the exact opposite.” *Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 521 (7th Cir.*
11 *2003)*. The District has *no right* to deprive parents of this critical information and control
12 concerning their child. The Policy plainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

14 Affirming a child’s discordant gender identity involves significant mental health and
15 medical decisions affecting the well-being of children with potentially life-long consequences.
16 Therefore, by excluding parents from discussions regarding their children’s assertion of a
17 discordant gender identity and adopting the Protocol aimed at secretly affirming the
18 discordant gender identity, Defendants are making, and have made decisions that affect the
19 mental health of Plaintiffs’ children in contravention of Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights as
20 enumerated in the U.S. Constitution and Nevada law.

22 **C. DEFENDANTS’ REGULATION 5161 VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST**
23 **AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH**

24 Public-school students have First Amendment rights, and those rights do not disappear
25 “at the schoolhouse gate.” *Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506*
26 *(1969)*. Because “America’s public schools are the nurseries of democracy,” students must be
27 free to express their opinions, even if their views are “unpopular.” *Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v.*
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1 *B.L. by and through Levy*, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021). Protecting unpopular speech in
2 public schools “ensur[es] that future generations understand the workings in practice of the
3 well-known aphorism, ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right
4 to say it.’” *Id.*

5 Despite these well-established rights, schools often seek to stamp out controversial
6 student expression. Speech codes are the tried-and-true method of suppressing unpopular
7 student speech. They prohibit expression that would otherwise be constitutionally protected.
8
9 *See* Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, *Spotlight on Speech Codes 2021*, 10,
10 <https://bit.ly/3pdQ09E>.

11 Speech codes punish students for undesirable categories of speech such as
12 “harassment,” “bullying,” “hate speech,” and “incivility.” *Id.* Because these policies impose
13 vague, overbroad, content-based (and sometimes viewpoint-based) restrictions on speech,
14 federal courts regularly strike them down. *Id.* at 10, 24; *Speech First v. Fenves*, 979 F.3d 319,
15 338-39 n.17 (5th Cir. 2020) (collecting “a consistent line of cases that have uniformly found
16 campus speech codes unconstitutionally overbroad or vague”).

17
18 Schools are increasingly adopting speech codes regarding gender identity to compel
19 students to affirm beliefs they do not hold and that are incompatible with their deeply held
20 convictions. So-called “preferred pronouns policies” are an increasingly used method of
21 compelling student speech. “Preferred pronoun policies” subject students to formal discipline
22 for referring to other students according to the pronouns that are consistent with their biological
23 sex rather than their gender identity. Under these types of policies, a student who uses “he” or
24 “him” when referring to a biological male who identifies as a female will be punished for
25 “misgendering” that student. *See, e.g.*, Rick Esenberg & Luke Berg, *The Progressive Pronoun Police*
26 *Come for Middle Schoolers*, *The Wall Street Journal*, (May 23, 2022), <https://on.wsj.com/3NTV50b>.
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1 The Supreme Court has “held time and again that freedom of speech ‘includes both the
2 right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.’” *Janus v. Am. Fed’n of*
3 *State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31*, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018). “[T]he latter is perhaps
4 the more sacred of the two rights.” *Telescope Media Grp. V. Lucero*, 936 F.3d 740, 752 (8th
5 Cir. 2019).

6 “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
7 or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
8 matters of opinion or *force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.*” *West*
9 *Virginia Bd. Of Ed. v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (emphasis added). “Compelling
10 individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable violates that cardinal
11 constitutional command, and in most contexts, any such effort would be universally
12 condemned.” *Janus*, 138 S. Ct. at 2463.

13 The Policy is no different from the policy requiring schoolchildren to pledge alliance
14 to the flag in *Barnette*. Like the West Virginia State Board of Education in *Barnette*, *cf.* 319
15 U.S. at 631, 633, Washoe County School District is requiring students to affirmatively declare
16 statements that they believe to be false and affirm ideologies with which they deeply disagree
17 or otherwise face discipline under Administrative Regulation 9200.

18 *Meriwether v. Hartop*, 992 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2021), is directly on point. There, the
19 Sixth Circuit held that a similar “preferred pronoun” requirement was “anathema to the
20 principles underlying the First Amendment.” *Id.* at 510. “Indeed, the premise that gender
21 identity is an idea ‘embraced and advocated by increasing numbers of people is all the more
22 reason to protect the First Amendment rights of those who wish to voice a different view.’”
23 *Id.* (quoting *Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale*, was a content-based regulation subject to strict
24 scrutiny).

1 In addition, “the First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends” to
2 “restrictions on particular viewpoints.” *Reed v. Town of Gilbert*, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015).
3 Viewpoint discrimination is flatly prohibited. *See Iancu v. Brunetti*, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302
4 (2019); *Mahanoy*, 141 S. Ct. at 2046 (schools cannot “suppress speech simply because it is
5 unpopular”).

6 Here, WCSD has adopted a policy that disciplines students for the content and
7 viewpoint of their speech. Specifically, Reg 5161 prohibits an intentional and/or persistent
8 refusal to respect a student’s gender identity. Reg 5161 also prohibits “misgendering,” which
9 it defines as instances when hen a person accidentally or intentionally uses the incorrect name
10 or pronouns to refer to a person. This is a classic content-based and viewpoint-based
11 regulation of speech. *See, e.g., Saxe v. State College Area School District*, 240 F.3d 200, 206
12 (3d Cir. 2001) (bans on “harassment” covering speech impose “content-based” and often
13 “viewpoint-discriminatory” restrictions on that speech).

14 WCSD has no compelling interest in suppressing this type of student speech, and, even
15 if it did, the District’s restrictions are not narrowly tailored to further that interest. *See*
16 *Mahanoy*, 141 S. Ct. at 2046; *see also Willson v. City of Bel-Nor, Missouri*, 924 F.3d 995,
17 1001 (8th Cir. 2019).

18 **D. DEFENDANTS MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT REGULATION 5161 WAS**
19 **ISSUED TO FURTHER A COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST AND**
20 **MUST BE NARROWLY TAILORED TO ACHIEVE THAT INTEREST**

21 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall
22 “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.
23 amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted this guarantee “to include a substantive
24 component, which forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at
25 all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
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1 compelling state interest.” *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993). To survive strict
2 scrutiny, the government must show that “the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is
3 narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” *Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n*, 558 U.S.
4 310, 340, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010).

5 The Supreme Court has long held that “the right of parents to make decisions
6 concerning the care, custody, and control of their children is a fundamental liberty interest
7 protected by the Due Process Clause,” and that this right includes “the right of parents to be
8 free from state interference with their choice of the educational forum itself.” *Fields v.*
9 *Palmdale School District*, 427 F.3d 1197, 1204,1207 (9th Cir. 2005)

10 Thus, even as the Court has “always been reluctant to expand the concept of
11 substantive due process,” it has repeatedly reaffirmed its recognition, in *Meyer v. Nebraska*,
12 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)., of a “fundamental
13 right[]” to “direct the education and upbringing of one’s children.” *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at
14 720 (citation omitted); see also *Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality) (describing the *Meyer*-right
15 as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized” by the Court); *Id.* at 80.
16 In *Meyer*, the Supreme Court struck down the Nebraska statute, concluding that it
17 impermissibly “attempted materially to interfere . . . with the power of parents to control the
18 education of their own.” *Id.* at 401.

19 To satisfy strict scrutiny, Defendants must show that their infringement of the
20 Plaintiffs’ rights is “narrowly tailored” to advance a “compelling” state interest. *Church of the*
21 *Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah*, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). “

22 **E. REGULATION 5161 IS OVERBROAD AND VAGUE AND IS THEREFORE**
23 **PROHIBITED**

24 The First Amendment also prohibits the government from adopting regulations of
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1 students that are “so broad as to chill the exercise of free speech and expression.” *Dambrot v.*
2 *Cent. Michigan Univ.*, 55 F.3d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 1995). “Because First Amendment
3 freedoms need breathing space to survive, a state may regulate in the area only with narrow
4 specificity.” *Gooding v. Wilson*, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972). Schools must carefully craft their
5 regulations “to punish only speech and not be susceptible of application to protected
6 expression.” *Id.*

7
8 Reg 5161 and 9200 are unconstitutionally overbroad. By its terms, the Regulations
9 apply to protected speech and virtually any opinion or political belief—as well as any use of
10 humor, satire, or parody— could be perceived as “a refusal ... to respect a student’s gender
11 identity.” Regs 5161 and 9200 also do not differentiate between “on campus” and “off
12 campus” speech, even though the District’s ability to punish off-campus speech is extremely
13 limited. *See Mahanoy*, 141 S. Ct. at 2046. Courts regularly find these types of far-reaching
14 school policies to be unconstitutionally overbroad. *See, e.g., Saxe*, 240 F.3d at 215-16 (high
15 school speech policy punishing “harassment” was overbroad because it “prohibit[ed] a
16 substantial amount of non-vulgar, non-sponsored student speech”); *Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks*
17 *School Dist.*, 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 701-02 (W.D. Penn. 2003) (speech policy prohibiting
18 “abusive,” “inappropriate,” and “offen[sive]” language was overbroad).

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20
21 It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
22 prohibitions are not clearly defined.” *Grayned v. City of Rockford*, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
23 “[T]he vagueness doctrine has two primary goals: (1) to ensure fair notice to the citizenry and
24 (2) to provide standards for enforcement [by officials].” *Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v.*
25 *City of Cleveland*, 502 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2007); *see also Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty.*
26 *Sch. Dist.*, 110 F.3d 1303, 1311 (8th Cir. 1997) (“a central purpose of the vagueness doctrine”
27 is to prevent “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”).
28

1 “With respect to the first goal, ... ‘[a] statute which either forbids or requires the doing
2 of an act in terms so vague that [individuals] of common intelligence must necessarily guess
3 at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
4 law.’” *Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters*, 502 F.3d at 551 (quoting *Connally v. Gen. Constr.*
5 *Co.*, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925)). “With respect to the second goal, ... ‘if arbitrary and
6 discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those
7 who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to [officials] for
8 resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.’” *Id.* (quoting *Grayned*, 408 U.S. at 108-09).

10 This principle of clarity is especially demanding when First Amendment freedoms are
11 at stake. If the challenged law “interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a
12 more stringent vagueness test should apply.” *Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman*
13 *Estates, Inc.*, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982). “Certainty is all the more essential when vagueness
14 might induce individuals to forego their rights of speech, press, and association for fear of
15 violating an unclear law.” *Scull v. Va. ex rel. Comm. on Law Reform & Racial Activities*, 359
16 U.S. 344, 353 (1959).

18 Regulations 5161 and 9200, among other things, lacks any definitions, detail, context,
19 or notice to students about what sorts of statements WCSD views as “harassment” and
20 “discrimination.” This provision guarantees arbitrary enforcement and is therefore
21 unconstitutional.
22

23 **F. REGULATION 5161 VIOLATES THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE**
24 **FIRST AMENDMENT**

25 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
26 applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits Defendants from abridging
27 Plaintiffs’ right to free exercise of religion.
28

1 Plaintiffs have sincerely held religious beliefs that human beings are created male or
2 female and that the natural created order regarding human sexuality cannot be changed
3 regardless of individual feelings, beliefs, or discomfort with one’s identity, and biological
4 reality, as either male or female.

5 Plaintiffs have sincerely held religious beliefs that parents have the non-delegable duty
6 to direct the upbringing and beliefs, religious training, and medical and mental health care of
7 their children and any intrusion of the government into that realm infringes upon the free
8 exercise of their religion.

9
10 Defendants’ actions in excluding Plaintiffs from decision making regarding their
11 children’s sexual and gender identity target the Plaintiffs’ beliefs regarding the created order,
12 human nature, sexuality, gender, ethics, and morality which constitute central components of
13 their sincerely held religious beliefs. Defendants’ actions further cause a direct and immediate
14 conflict with Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs by prohibiting them from being informed of mental
15 health issues their children are or might be undergoing and denying them the opportunity to
16 seek counseling and guidance for their children in a manner that is consistent with the beliefs
17 sincerely held by their family instead of the government.

18 Defendants’ actions are coercive in that they deliberately supplant Plaintiffs’ role as
19 advisors of the moral and religious development of their children so that they are not able to
20 direct their children’s mental health care and counseling regarding sex and gender identity in
21 accordance with their values because Defendants have substituted the state’s perspective on
22 the issues of sex and gender identity for the perspective of Plaintiffs in violation of Plaintiffs’
23 free exercise rights.

24
25 Defendants’ actions are neither neutral nor generally applicable, but rather, specifically
26 and discriminatorily target the religious speech, beliefs, and viewpoint of Plaintiffs and thus
27 expressly constitute a substantial burden on sincerely held religious beliefs that are contrary to
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1 Defendants' viewpoint regarding gender identity and affirmation of a discordant gender
2 identity.

3 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no
4 law respecting an establishment of religion, or *prohibiting the free exercise thereof*." U.S.
5 Const. amend. I (emphasis added). Under the federal Free Exercise Clause, a law that
6 "discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it
7 is undertaken for religious reasons" is subject to strict scrutiny. *Church of the Lukumi Babalu*
8 *Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah*, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).

9
10 To survive that "stringent standard," the government must prove that the law is
11 narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. *Trinity Lutheran Church of*
12 *Columbia, Inc. v. Comer*, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017). As discussed *supra*, the regulation
13 5161 cannot survive strict scrutiny. Under current constitutional jurisprudence, "the right of
14 free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and
15 neutral law of general applicability.'" *Emp't Div. v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). Thus, a
16 law that is "neutral" and "generally applicable" is not subject to strict scrutiny even if it has
17 the incidental effect of burdening a religious belief or practice. *See id.* But this "rule comes
18 with an exception." *Ward v. Polite*, 667 F.3d 727, 738 (6th Cir. 2012).

19
20 When the policy "appears to be neutral and generally applicable on its face, but in
21 practice is riddled with exemptions," it "must run the gauntlet of strict scrutiny." *Id.* at 740.

22 "At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue
23 discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it
24 is undertaken for religious reasons." *Lukumi*, 508 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added); *see also*
25 *Trinity Lutheran*, 137 S. Ct. at 2021 ("Nor may a law regulate or outlaw conduct because it is
26 religiously motivated.") (emphasis added).

1 If a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public
2 morals, or the public safety has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, **beyond**
3 **all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the**
4 **duty of the courts to so adjudge**, and thereby give effect to the Constitution." [*Emphasis*
5 *added*] *Id.*, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905) citing to *Mugler v. Kansas*, 123 U. S. 623, 123 U. S.
6 661; *Minnesota v. Barber*, 136 U. S. 313, 136 U. S. 320; *Atkin v. Kansas*, 191 U. S. 207, 191
7 U. S. 223.

8 **G. THIS COURT CAN ENJOIN THE REGULATIONS IMMEDIATELY**

9 Importantly and most recently, *Whole Woman's Health Et Al v. Austin Reeve Jackson,*
10 *Judge Et Al* 594 U. S. ____ (2021) demonstrates that this Court does have the authority to
11 enjoin the regulations under the jurisprudence cited above, including *Roe v Wade*, *Griswold v*
12 *Connecticut* and *Troxel v Granville*.

14 As the dissent cited in *Whole Woman's Health Et Al* this Court is authorized to permit
15 those whom a law threatens with constitutional harm to bring pre-enforcement challenges to
16 the law where the harm is less serious and the threat of enforcement less certain than the harm
17 (and the threat) here. See *Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc.*, 484 U. S. 383, 392–
18 393 (1988); *Babbitt v. Farm Workers*, 442 U. S. 289, 298 (1979); see also *Susan B. Anthony*
19 *List v. Driehaus*, 573 U. S. 149, 164 (2014) (finding substantial threat of future enforcement
20 where statute permits “any person” to file a complaint and “the universe of potential
21 complainants is not restricted”).

24 Normally, where a legal right is “invaded,” the law provides “a legal remedy by suit
25 or action at law.” *Marbury v. Madison*, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 *W. Blackstone*
26 *Commentaries* *23). Here, these Plaintiffs bring action to this Court before violation of
27 Regulation 5161 and 9200, or any other children similarly situated.

1 **H. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUFFER IRREPERABLE HARM**

2 To obtain a TRO, Plaintiffs must show they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence
3 of the order. *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 20. The right of parental control is particularly strong in
4 circumstances involving “fundamental values” and “intimate decision[s].” *Arnold v. Bd. of*
5 *Educ. of Escambia Cnty. Ala.*, 880 F.2d 305, 313 (11th Cir. 1989) (parents’ rights protect “the
6 opportunity to counter influences on the child the parents find inimical to their religious
7 beliefs or the values they wish instilled in their children”); *see also H. L. v. Matheson*, 450
8 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) (parents’ rights “presumptively include[] counseling [their children] on
9 important decisions”). In such circumstances, parents are presumed to be fit to make decisions
10 for their children absent strong evidence to the contrary. *See Parham*, 442 U.S. at 602- 03.

11 The Supreme Court has paid special attention to the rights of parents “in cases
12 involving parent-state conflicts in the areas of medical care and education.” *Arnold*, 880 F.2d
13 at 312-13. Indeed, “[i]t is not educators, but parents who have primary rights in the upbringing
14 of children. School officials have only a secondary responsibility and must respect these
15 rights.” *Gruenke v. Seip*, 225 F.3d 290, 307 (3d Cir. 2000). “Public schools must not forget
16 that ‘*in loco parentis*’ does not mean displace parents.” *Id.*

17 A refusal to enjoin the application of Regulation 5161 will undoubtedly cause
18 irreparable harm by allowing the District to displace Plaintiffs’ values and preclude parents
19 from making decisions for their children.

20 **I. BALANCE OF EQUITIES FAVORS PLAINTIFFS**

21 **1. *Defendants Have Not Demonstrated Regulation 5161 and 9200 are***
22 ***Narrowly Tailored to a Compelling State Interest***

23 Evaluating whether a government measure is narrowly tailored is not simply a matter
24 of ordinary fact-finding, however. Narrow tailoring is viewed as a mixed question of fact and
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1 law that requires a delicate balancing of legal principles as applied to specific circumstances.
2 *See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 861 (9th Cir. 1999); Gerritsen v. City of*
3 *Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 575 (9th Cir. 1993).*

4 Plaintiffs must also show that the balance of equities tips in their favor. *Winter, 555*
5 *U.S. at 20.* The data provided above is a canvas of all States and positivity cases across the
6 Country which clearly demonstrates that the efficacy of facemasks in the classrooms is at best
7 questionable to prevent the spread of Covid-19. Notwithstanding the efficacy of such mask
8 mandate, Defendants still fail to fulfill the requirements of due process and demonstrate that
9 the States' action should stand in place of parental decisions regarding their children's health.

11 **J. AN INJUNCTION IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST**

12 Lastly, to obtain a TRO, Plaintiffs must show that the granting of a TRO is in the public
13 interest., *555 U.S. at 20.* The public interest is furthered by preventing the violation of a
14 party's constitutional rights. *Free the Nipple v. City of Ft. Collins, Colo, 916 F.3d 792 (2019).*
15 "[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights."
16 *Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1145 (10th Cir. 2013), aff'd' sub nom.*
17 *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (quotations omitted).*

18 Because the requested injunction will accomplish this, the public interest also favors an
19 order protecting Plaintiffs making the grant of an injunction in this case a matter of
20 overwhelming public interest.

23 **CONCLUSION**

24 Again and again, the Supreme Court has affirmed the "fundamental right of parents to
25 make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." *Troxel, 530 U.S.*
26 *at 66 (listing cases).* Simply put, "[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
27 strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children." *Yoder,*
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406 U.S. at 232. “This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.” *Id.*

Reg 5161 violates parents’ constitutional rights and deprives parents of their right to know what actions WCSD is taking with regards to fundamentally important decisions about their children.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs request an injunction be issued as follows:

1. Permanently enjoin Defendants and all persons and entities in active concert or participation with Defendants from engaging in Regulation 5161 in Washoe County School District.
2. Issue an Order permanently repealing Regulation 5161 associated with parental rights and gender identity/non-conformity policies in Washoe County School District, and concurrently, repeal said portions of discipline associated therewith in Regulation 9200.

DATED this 11th day of May, 2023.

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